When the Governor of Aden, William Luce, informed the Colonial Office that he was proposing to ban strike action in the colony, they responded that his proposal would 'amount to an extreme departure from the labour policies consistently pursued by successive Secretaries of State. have not generally been the concerns of labour historians. Such reticence is easily justified on the basis that it has taken a great deal of scholarly effort to drag the attention of historians away from their earlier preoccupation with the activities of political elites to the lives of ordinary working people; but it is also problematic in the sense that the broader political context is integral to an understanding of industrial conflicts during the years of imperial decline. The political endeavours of the nascent trade unions of Africa, Asia and the Americas were embedded in the wider processed of decolonisation and the Cold War. Peter
'Aden Colony is going through a period of rapid and violent transition. The face of Aden must have changed astonishingly in these last few years and at the present rate of new building port development and so on it will change as much again in the next few years... the only thing that surprises me is that Aden was able to escape for so long the sort of difficulties which have been part of life in most of these territories for a number of years.' 7 Two years later, on 26 April 1958, Luce's apprehensions were realised when ATUC organised a widely observed general strike. At this stage their grievances were more economic than broadly political and included increased non-Arab immigration into the town, the lack of social infrastructure and escalating price inflation. Luce and the Colonial Office were unsympathetic and prepared instead for a new conflict with the Yemeni labour force.
One motivation for the introduction of the IRO was to correct this imbalance in the labour market by pushing out the numerous Yemeni migrants. The Aden authorities estimated that the Adenese workforce consisted of 28,000 Yemenis, 14,000 incomers from the surrounding protected states and 22,000 Adenis. On top of this there were 6,000 registered and 10,000 unregistered unemployed. The over-supply of labour operated as a disincentive for the colonial authorities to provide any measure of social provision for the new migrants. Any outflux of Yemenis would, they estimated, drive up wages and increase productivity. They concluded: 'For economic as well as political reasons it would be in the Colony's interest to reduce the labour force at the expense of the migrant workers... If employers could achieve a smaller settled labour force with a higher productivity they would be prepared to give higher wages and fringe benefits.' Worse still from the British perspective, the migrants provided an army of recruits for the Arab nationalist cause which was being championed by Egypt's President Nasser. As the only formal British colony ever established in the Arab world, it was almost inevitable that Aden should become a new front in the ongoing conflict between European imperialism and Middle Eastern nationalism. After a century of management from India, the town was transferred to direct British administration in 1937, at a time when European influence in the region was still exerted informally through League of Nations mandates, treaties of protection and advisory relationships. The governance of the Colony remained untrammelled by any element of popular participation until the first elections were contested in 1955. Further polls followed in 1959 and 1964 but ATUC leaders and their external supporters criticised the narrowness of the franchise which excluded almost the entire Arab workforce. It would have been impossible to pass a measure such as the IRO through the Legislative Council had its members been elected by a wider constituency. More significantly still, no popular mandate was requested for the most contentious measure undertaken during the last years of British rule, namely the incorporation of Aden into a federation which was dominated by the ruling families of the hinterland states who were regarded by the Colonial Office as reliable allies, capable of restraining militant anti-colonialism in Aden. The hostility of the Sultans and Sheikhs to democracy and trade unionism ensured that the merger controversy witnessed a mingling of political and economic protest in Aden. Most ominously of all from Luce's perspective, the economic demands of workers for better pay and conditions and their political demands for a greater say in the running of the Colony's affairs and the exclusion of Sultanic influence, were now expressed in a Nasserist lexicon which had been assimilated through the broadcasts of Radio Cairo. In this way notions of Arab unity, social reform and, overshadowing almost everything else, anticolonialism, entered local political debates. By 1962 ATUC had emerged as a champion of Arab nationalism in Aden and it was estimated that its affiliates had a total of 17-18,000 members.
9
The willingness of ATUC's leaders to climb aboard the Arab nationalist bandwagon was manifest in their decision to affiliate to the Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (CATU) in 1960. This was a move which had been long anticipated and long feared by the British authorities on the grounds that CATU was the industrial arm of Nasserism and Nasser 'Steam is at present let off through a series of strikes, cumulatively damaging and provocative, but not yet in themselves decisive politically or economically. The more these outlets are closed, the greater head of steam can be expected to build up and the greater the prospects that it will break out, if at all, as a direct challenge to law and order and to government.'
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It was also necessary to consider Britain's international reputation and, although officials were justifiably confident that the new legislation would not breach ILO conventions, they also anticipated what was euphemistically described as 'a lively reaction in international labour circles'.
12 Models for such legislation could be found but they came from outside the formal empire, most notably Australia. To draw the sting from international criticisms, Luce's initial proposals were revised to enable unions who reached voluntary agreements with employers to obtain exemption from the stipulations regarding compulsory arbitration.
The second issue over which the past loomed was a traditional bugbear of government, the 'political strike'. The key precedent in this regard was not the refinery dispute which had From the outset the connection between the political and industrial struggle in Aden were obvious to all parties: trade unionists made little attempt to camouflage their interest in promoting Arab independence and, while the colonial authorities put more effort into maintaining the distinction in public, they utilised the IRO as a weapon to suppress political dissent in the Colony. Restrictive industrial relations legislation was designed to challenge the ATUC's 'unprecedented control of the workforce' which was interpreted by local intelligence as a threat to British control of the town and the base. Reports described union meetings as the principal forum for subversion; the breaking up of such gatherings signalled the intention of the authorities to challenge ATUC's accumulating influence over popular opinion.
18 Anybody who voiced support for strike action at such meetings was vulnerable to legal action. By February 1963 there had been 229 prosecutions under the IRO and, although many of those convicted had paid fines to avoid imprisonment, 11 union members were in jail at that time. 19 In some respects these legal processes were less significant than the pretext the IRO provided for a crackdown on those identified by the local security forces as militants. Perhaps even more damaging than the unwillingness of the leading employer to support the legislation were the actions of some non-ATUC employees who inadvertently delivered a damaging blow to the operations of the Ordinance. A handful of expatriate Indian workers employed by the oldest and most prestigious merchant house at the port, Cowasji Dinshaw, formed their own staff association which was unaffiliated to ATUC. When the company proposed altering the terms by which it calculated severance pay, a dispute arose. Under the terms of the IRO, the Industrial Court made an arbitration award which favoured the workers.
It was hoped by the colonial administration that this would encourage others to cooperate with the new system but, instead, the company took the case to the local appellate court. Aside from prosecuting and imprisoning union organisers and strikers, the colonial government found other means to suppress political dissent emanating from the labour movement, including the deportation of workers and restrictions on press freedom.
Deportations were primarily intended to instil fear among political opponents and became a source of grievance for ATUC and their external supporters. In reply, the Labour Commissioner criticised the willingness of the ICFTU to air its grievances at the ILO rather than dealing bilaterally with elected representatives in Aden and suggested that the organisation 'did not seem to know there was a local government based on elections.' 43 On his return, Galaoui, told the Tunisian press that Adenese unions 'met with all kinds of persecution', and noted that, when migrant workers were dismissed, there was a practice of 'taking them to the Yemen border and throwing them out.' 44 At the seventh world congress of the ICFTU in July 1962, ATUC secured endorsement for a resolution condemning the perpetuation of British colonialism in Aden. In response to pressure from ATUC, the ICFTU also renewed its complaints to the ILO about the manner in which the Aden administration were conducting industrial relations. The ILO responded by reiterating their view that the British authorities in Aden had met the minimum standards required to enable freedom of association by workers.
While continental Europeans, such as Tofahrn, and Maghrebi Arabs, such as Galaoui, issued unvarnished criticisms of colonialism, British trade unionists were more reticent. Prior to 1960 the British TUC had embraced the task of shepherding their Adeni equivalents to respectability. The process had benefits for all parties: British colonial officialdom believed the metropolitan trade unions would curb radicalism in the periphery, the TUC had an opportunity to extend its influence and construct some institutional defences against communist infiltration and the colonial unions hoped to gain financial and administrative support and to mobilise their metropolitan allies to influence debates in Whitehall and
Westminster. In March 1957 Luce suggested that the intervention of the British TUC would be welcome. 45 Subsequently, James Young, Herbert Lewis and Andrew Dalgleish became the key intermediaries between ATUC. The TUC was often critical of the ICFTU's anticommunist zealotry, which they believed was inspired by Cold War partisans in the AFL-CIO. They were also more sceptical than the American unions about the probity and efficiency of colonial unions and considered that the paternal role they adopted in relations with the nascent unions of the imperial periphery was jeopardised when labour activists from across the Atlantic trespassed onto British colonial territory. The strike at the refinery in 1960, which acted as a catalyst for the introduction of the IRO, was not supported by the Tewson, the Colonial Office offered to suspend the enactment of the IRO, but this manoeuvre was founded on the warranted assumption that al-Asnag's 'hot-headed colleagues' would not allow him to reach a compromise deal.
Once it became clear that the British administration in Aden intended to use the legislation to suppress political dissent, the metropolitan labour movement became increasingly uneasy.
Marjorie Nicholson of the International Department of the TUC and the Labour MP, Bob
Edwards, who had close links to the TUC, were the most prominent British critics of the IRO.
One Colonial Office functionary described Nicholson as 'an ardent apologist for the ATUC cause.' 48 Her primary concern was that the IRO had generated deadlock on the industrial relations front in Aden which would ensure that discontent spilled over into political activity:
'there is a danger of illegal strikes getting out of control of the ATUC and the further danger the legislation than the British government. The Colonial Office were preoccupied with the threat which ATUC posed to orderly politics and, although they were insistent that many of their problems were attributable to external manipulation, they believed the principal troublemakers were inspired by Cairo rather than Moscow. ATUC responded by drawing on the dense institutional web of the international labour movement and it is this aspect of the affair which makes it such an interesting case of the globalisation of labour conflict. As they pursued an agenda which sought greater equity in the treatment of workers and political independence, trade unions were subject to many restrictions, but one resource which they could exploit was their global connections. In the case of ATUC they drew at different times on support from the Arab unions of CATU, the western-oriented unions of the ICFTU and the eastern-oriented unions of the WFTU. By this means a local conflict over trade union legislation became embroiled in much wider debates about the role of labour in the Cold War and decolonisation.
